营销科学学报 ›› 2013, Vol. 9 ›› Issue (2): 71-89.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

网络口碑传播对寡头卖家定价策略的影响

张明玺,雷明, 郑晓娜   

  1. 张明玺,北京大学光华管理学院管理科学与工程系博士研究生,通讯作者,E-mail:mxzhang@pku.edu.cn。
    雷明,北京大学光华管理学院管理科学与工程系教授,博士生导师,E-mail:leiming@gsm.pku.edu.cn。
    郑晓娜,北京大学光华管理学院管理科学与工程系副教授,E-mail:xzheng@gsm.pku.edu.cn。
  • 出版日期:2013-06-01 发布日期:2013-08-09
  • 基金资助:

    基金项目:感谢《营销科学学报》的编委及匿名评审专家对本文的完善所提供的建设性意见。本文受国家自然科学基金项目(70902015,71272039)资助。特此致!

TheImpactofOnlineWord-of-MouthDisseminationonthe OligarchSeller’sPricingStrategy

Zhang Mingxi,Lei Ming,Zheng Xiaona   

  1. Guanghua School of Management, Peking University
  • Online:2013-06-01 Published:2013-08-09

摘要:

文章以顾客对产品的认知价值为桥梁,建立网购行业中网络口碑盛行与卖家不断调价这两个显著现象之间的内在联系,构建了一个基于网络口碑传播影响的寡头卖家两阶段定价模型。有见识顾客拥有较多产品信息,缺见识顾客拥有较少产品信息,网络口碑传播可改变顾客对产品的认知价值。有见识顾客追求最大化购买产品和传播口碑带来的总效用,寡头卖家通过采用合理的定价策略最大化两阶段总利润。研究表明,若有见识顾客拥有较多正面信息,(1)随着信息差距从大逐渐变小,(a)当信息传播相对无效时,卖家最优定价策略一般依次经历三个过程:放弃激励定价,有见识顾客不传播信息;实施激励定价,有见识顾客传播信息;停止激励定价,有见识顾客付出最大努力传播信息。(b)当信息传播相对有效时,卖家最优定价策略一般将依次只经历上述三个过程中的后两个过程。(2)若考虑信息对两类顾客的价值存在差异,只有当信息传播的无效性相对于高信息价值较小时,这种差异才会影响卖家与有见识顾客的最优决策。从定性角度来看,随着信息对接收方(缺见识顾客)的价值不断增大,导致卖家最优策略为实施激励定价的信息差距范围先增大后减小。这些研究发现给网络商家的定价策略提供了一些有用的管理启示。

关键词: 网络口碑, 顾客认知价值, 激励定价, 信息差距

Abstract:

Based on consumer perceived value, this paper connects the prevalence of online word-of-mouth and the sellers’ price-adjusting behavior in e-commerce. We build a two-stage pricing model for an oligarch seller, based on the influence of online word-of-mouth dissemination. The informed customers possess more product information and the less-informed customers own less product information. The information disseminated through online word-of-mouth can change customer perceived value. The informed customers pursue to maximize total utility acquired from both purchasing product and disseminate online word-of-mouth. The oligarch seller adopts reasonable pricing strategies to maximize total profit of two stages. We find that if the informed customers have more positive information, (1)With information gap decreasing gradually, (a)when information dissemination is relatively inefficient, the seller’s optimal pricing strategy usually experiences the following three processes sequentially: giving up incentive pricing strategy and no information disseminated by the informed customers, implementing incentive pricing strategy and some information shared by the informed customers, and ceasing to incentive strategy but the largest amount of information shared by the informed customers. (b)When information dissemination is relatively efficient, the seller’s optimal pricing strategy just experiences the last two processes of above three processes sequentially. (2)Under the existence of the difference of information value for the two segment customers, only when the inefficiency of information dissemination is smaller, relative to high information value, this difference can affect the optimal decisions of the seller and the informed customers. And from the qualitative point of view, with information value for the receivers (the less-informed customers) increasing continually, the range of information gap resulting in that the seller’s optimal strategy is to exert incentive pricing will increase first and then decrease. These findings provide some usefully managerial insights for online sellers’ pricing strategy.

Key words: Online word-of-mouth, Customer perceived value, Incentive pricing, Information gap